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Abstract. A fundamental open problem in the area of blockchain pro-
tocols is whether the Bitcoin protocol is the only solution for building
a secure transaction ledger. A recently proposed and widely considered
alternative is the GHOST protocol which, notably, was proposed to be
at the core of Ethereum as well as other recent proposals for improved
Bitcoin-like systems. The GHOST variant is touted as oﬀering superior
performance compared to Bitcoin (potentially oﬀering block production
speed up by a factor of more than 40) without a security loss. Motivated
by this, in this work, we study from a provable security point of view the
GHOST protocol.
We introduce a new formal framework for the analysis of blockchain pro-
tocols that relies on trees (rather than chains) and we showcase the power
of the framework by providing a uniﬁed description of the GHOST and Bit-
coin protocols, the former of which we extract and formally describe. We
then prove that GHOST implements a robust transaction ledger (i.e.,
possesses liveness and persistence) and hence it is a provably secure al-
ternative to Bitcoin; moreover, our bound for the liveness parameter is
superior to that proven for the bitcoin backbone in line with the original
expectation for GHOST. Our proof follows a novel methodology for estab-
lishing that GHOST is a robust transaction ledger compared to previous
works, which may be of independent interest and can be applicable to
other blockchain variants.
Keywords: GHOST, provable security, bitcoin, blockchain protocols
1 Introduction
The popularity of Bitcoin [19] has lead to a surge in the interest about its core
protocol that maintains a distributed data structure called the blockchain. In
[9], the core of the Bitcoin protocol was abstracted under the moniker Bitcoin
Backbone and it was demonstrated to be a powerful tool for solving consensus,
[23, 17], in a synchronous, anonymous and Byzantine setting where (unreliable)
? Research supported by ERC project CODAMODA. Part of this work was based in
a technical report published in e-print (https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1019).
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broadcast is the communication operation available to the participants, (a prob-
lem ﬁrst considered in [2, 20]). In [9], it was shown that the core protocol provably
guarantees two properties: (i) persistence: if a transaction is reported as stable
by one node, then it will be also reported as such by any other honest node
of the system, (ii) liveness: all honestly generated transactions that are broad-
casted are eventually reported as stable by some honest node. This provides
a formal framework for proving the security of systems like Bitcoin, since their
security can be reduced to the persistence and liveness of the underlying transac-
tion ledger. Furthermore, it provides a way to argue formally about transaction
conﬁrmation time since the liveness property is equipped with a delay param-
eter that speciﬁes the maximum transaction delay that can be caused by an
adversary.
Naturally, implementing a robust transaction ledger may be achieved in var-
ious other ways, and it is a fundamental open question of the area whether the
Bitcoin protocol itself is an optimal implementation of a robust transaction
ledger, i.e. whether the parameters of the persistence and liveness properties are
optimal. Indeed, many researchers have challenged various aspects of the Bitcoin
system and they have proposed modiﬁcations in its core operation. Some of the
modiﬁed systems maintain the protocol structure but modify the hard-coded
parameters (like the block generation rate) or the basic primitives, e.g., the way
proof of work is performed (a number of alternative proof of work implementa-
tions have been proposed using functions like scrypt [24], lyra2 [26] and others).
However, more radical modiﬁcations are possible that alter the actual operation
of the protocol.
One of the most notable such variants is the GHOST protocol, which was sug-
gested by Sompolinsky and Zohar in [27]. After the initial suggestion many
cryptocurrencies using variants of the GHOST rule were proposed and imple-
mented. The most popular among them, Ethereum [6] has received substantial
research attention [16, 15, 4, 25, 12, 21]. Ethereum is essentially a Bitcoin-like sys-
tem where transaction processing is Turing-complete and thus it can be used to
implement any public functionality in a distributed way. Bitcoin-NG [7] is an-
other popular Bitcoin-like system relying on GHOST that separates blocks in two
categories, namely key blocks and microblocks, reﬂecting the fact that transac-
tion serialization and leader election may be separated.
Unfortunately, the security analysis of [27] is not as general as [9] (e.g., their
attacker does not take advantage of providing conﬂicting information to diﬀerent
honest parties), while the analysis of [9] does not carry to the setting of GHOST.
This is because the GHOST rule is a natural, albeit radical, reformulation of how
each miner determines the main chain. In GHOST, miners adopt blocks in the
structure of a tree. Note that in both Bitcoin and GHOST one can consider parties
collecting all mined blocks in a tree data structure. However, while in Bitcoin
the miners would choose the most diﬃcult chain as the main chain, in GHOST,
they will determine the chain by greedily following the heaviest observed sub-
tree. This means that for the same subtree, a Bitcoin miner and a GHOST miner
may choose a completely diﬀerent main chain. Furthermore, it means that the
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diﬃculty of the main chain of honest parties does not necessarily increase mono-
tonically (it may decrease at times) and thus a fundamental argument (namely
that blockchains monotonically increase) that made the analysis of [9] possible,
does not hold anymore.
Our Results. We propose a new analysis framework for blockchain protocols
focusing on trees of blocks as opposed to chains as in [9]. Our framework enables
us to argue about random variables on the trees of blocks that are formed by
the participants. In our framework, we can express concepts like a node being
d-dominant, which means that the block corresponding to that node would
be preferred by a margin of d compared to other sibling nodes according to
a speciﬁed weight measure. This actually enables us to unify the description of
Bitcoin and GHOST by showing they obey the same rule, but simply for a diﬀerent
weight measure.
Using our framework we then provide a ﬁrst formal security proof of the
GHOST rule for blockchain protocols. Speciﬁcally, we prove that GHOST is a robust
transaction ledger that satisﬁes liveness and persistence. We achieve this result,
by a new methodology, that reduces the properties of the robust transaction
ledger to a single lemma, that we call the fresh block lemma and is informally
stated as follows.
Fresh Block Lemma. (Informally) At any point of the execution and for
any past sequence of s consecutive rounds, there exists an honest block
mined in these rounds, that is contained in the chain of any honest player
from this point on.
As we will demonstrate, the fresh block lemma is a powerful tool in the pres-
ence of an adversary: we show easily that the properties of the robust transaction
ledger reduce to it in a black-box fashion.
In more details our result is as follows. In blockchain protocols there is a predi-
cate parameterized by a security parameter k that determines when a transaction
has been stabilized in the ledger. The stable predicate for Bitcoin can be seen
to be true whenever the transaction is at least k blocks deep in the blockchain.
The stable predicate for GHOST is diﬀerent and is true whenever the block that
the transaction belongs to is the root of a subtree of at least k blocks. We prove
the following.
Persistence: if in a certain round an honest player reports a transaction
tx as stable, then when an honest party reports tx transaction as stable
tx will be in the same position in the ledger.
Liveness: if a transaction is given as input to all honest players continu-
ously for u = Θ(k) rounds then all of them will report it as stable.
The above properties will depend on the parameter k of the stable predi-
cate of GHOST; we prove them to hold with a probability of error which drops
exponentially in k over all executions of the protocol.
Our proof strategy for persistence and liveness utilizes the fresh block lemma
in the following (black-box) manner.
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In the case of persistence, it is suﬃcient to ensure that reporting the transac-
tion as stable by any honest player implies that a suﬃcient amount of time has
passed so that the fresh block lemma is applicable and has produced a block that
is a descendant of the block that contains the transaction. Using the moderate
hardness of proofs of work (speciﬁcally that they are hard enough) it is easy to
translate from number of blocks in a subtree to actual running time in terms
of rounds. It follows that the fresh block lemma applies and all honest parties
will be mining on a subtree rooted at this fresh block for the remaining of the
execution. As a result, the transaction will always be reported as stable since it
belongs to the heaviest observed path for all of the honest parties.
In the case of liveness, we proceed in two steps. First, for our choice of u, in a
time window lasting Θ(k) rounds, it will be ensured that the fresh block lemma
can be applied once implying that all honest parties will mine blocks in a subtree
rooted by a common block that includes the transaction. Then, after another
Θ(k) rounds, the honest parties will have accumulated enough honest blocks
in this subtree to pronounce this transaction as stable. This latter statement
requires again the moderate hardness of proofs of work but from the opposite
perspective, i.e., that they are easy enough.
The above strategy provides an alternative proof methodology for establish-
ing the properties of a robust transaction ledger compared to previous works
that analyzed blockchain protocols, [9], [13] and [22] who reduced the properties
of the robust transaction ledger to three other properties called common pre-
ﬁx, chain quality and chain growth. As such, the proof strategy itself may be
of independent interest as it could be applicable to other blockchain variants,
especially those that are using trees of blocks instead of chains of blocks as in
bitcoin in their chain selection rule.
Our results align with the original expectation that GHOST performs better
than bitcoin in terms of liveness, since our proven liveness parameter is superior
to the liveness parameter for bitcoin proven in [9].
On the generality of the adversarial model. The adversarial model we
adopt in this work is the one proposed by Garay et al. [9]. This model is quite
general in the sense that, it can captures many attack models that were proposed
in the literature. For example, it captures the double spending attacker of [19],
the block withholding attacker of [8] (which can be simulated because the adver-
sary can change the order in which messages arrive for each honest player) and
the eclipse attacker of [5] where the communication of a portion of the honest
nodes in the network is completely controlled (eclipsed) by the adversary (this
can be simulated by simply considering the eclipsed nodes to be controlled by
the adversary and having the adversary honestly execute their program while
dropping their incoming messages). For a quantitative analysis of these attacks
the reader is referred to [10].
Limitations and directions for future research. Our analysis is in the
standard Byzantine model where parties fall into two categories, those that are
honest (and follow the protocol) and those that are dishonest and may deviate
in an arbitrary (and coordinated) fashion as dictated by the adversary. It is an
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interesting direction for future work to consider the rational setting where all
parties wish to optimize a certain utility function. Designing suitable incentive
mechanisms, for instance see [18] for a suggestion related to the GHOST proto-
col, or examining the requirements for setup assumptions, cf. [1], are related
important considerations. Our analysis is in the static setting, i.e., we do not
take into account the fact that parties change dynamically and that the protocol
calibrates the diﬃculty of the POW instances to account for that; we note that
this may open the possibility for additional attacks, say [3], and hence it is an
important point for consideration and future work. Finally, it is interesting to
consider our results in more general models such as the semi-synchronous model
of [22].
Organization. In section 2 we overview the model that we use for expressing
the protocols and the theorems regarding the security properties. In section 3
we introduce our new tree-based framework. Then, in section 4 we present our
security analysis of an abstraction of the GHOST protocol that demonstrates it is
a robust transaction ledger in the static setting.
2 Preliminaries and the GHOST Backbone protocol
2.1 Model
For our model we adopt the abstraction proposed in [9]. Speciﬁcally, in their
setting, called the q-bounded setting, synchronous communication is assumed
and each party is allowed q queries to a random oracle. The network supports
an anonymous message diﬀusion mechanism that is guaranteed to deliver the
messages of all honest parties in each round. The delivery of all messages occurs
at the start of the next round. Note that the diﬀusion mechanism is not reliable,
i.e. the adversary may send messages only to a portion of the parties in the net-
work. Moreover, the adversary is rushing and adaptive. Rushing here means that
in any given round he gets to see all honest players' messages before deciding on
his own strategy. In addition, he has complete control of the order that messages
arrive to each player. The model is ﬂat in terms of computational power in
the sense that all honest parties are assumed to have the same computational
power while the adversary has computational power proportional to the number
of players that it controls.
The total number of parties is n and the adversary is assumed to control
t of them (honest parties don't know any of these parameters). Obtaining a
new block is achieved by ﬁnding a hash value that is smaller than a diﬃculty
parameter D. The success probability that a single hashing query produces a
solution is p = D2κ where κ is the length of the hash. The total hashing power
of the honest players is α = pq(n − t), the hashing power of the adversary is
β = pqt and the total hashing power is f = α+ β. A number of deﬁnitions that
will be used extensively are listed below.
Deﬁnition 1. A round is called:
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 successful if at least one honest player computes a solution in this round.
 uniquely successful if exactly one honest player computes a solution in this
round.
Deﬁnition 2. In an execution blocks are called:
 honest, if mined by an honest party.
 adversarial, if mined by the adversary.
Deﬁnition 3. Some chain notation:
 By Cdk we denote the chain that results by dropping the last k blocks of C.
 We will say that a chain C′ extends another chain C if a non-empty preﬁx of
C′ is a suﬃx of C.
In [9], a lower bound to the probabilities of two events, that a round is
successful or that is uniquely successful (deﬁned above), was established and
denoted by γu = α−α2. While this bound is suﬃcient for the setting of small f ,
here we will need to use a better lower bound to the probability of those events,
denoted by γ, and with value approximately αe−α (see Appendix). Observe that
γ > γu.
2.2 The GHOST Backbone Protocol
In order to study the properties of the core Bitcoin protocol, the term Backbone
Protocol was introduced in [9]. At this level of abstraction we are only interested
in properties of the blockchain, independently from the data stored inside the
blocks. The main idea of the Bitcoin Backbone is that honest players, at every
round, receive new chains from the network and pick the longest valid one to
mine. Then, if they obtain a new block (by ﬁnding a small hash), they broadcast
their chain at the end of the round.
The same level of abstraction can also be used to express the GHOST protocol.
The GHOST Backbone protocol, as presented in [27], is based on the principle
that blocks that do not end up in the main chain, should also matter in the
chain selection process. In order to achieve this, players store a tree of all mined
blocks they have received, and then using the greedy heaviest observed subtree
(GHOST) rule, they pick which chain to mine.
At every round, players update their tree by adding valid1 blocks sent by
other players. The same principle as Bitcoin applies; for a block to be added to
the tree, it suﬃces to be a valid child of some other tree block. The adversary
can add blocks anywhere he wants in the tree, as long as they are valid. Again,
as in Bitcoin, players try to extend the chains they choose by one or more blocks.
Finally, in the main function, a tree of blocks is stored and updated at every
round. If a player updates his tree, he broadcasts it to all other players.
1 As in [9], a block B = 〈s, x, ctr〉 is valid if it satisﬁes two conditions:H(ctr,G(s, x)) <
D and ctr ≤ q, where D is the block's diﬃculty level and H,G are cryptographic
hash functions.
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Algorithm 1 The chain selection algorithm. The input is a block tree T . The
| · | operator corresponds to the number of nodes of a tree. By C1||C2 we denote
the concatenation of chains C1, C2.
1: function GHOST(T )
2: B ← root(T )
3: if childrenT (B) = ∅ then
4: return B
5: else
6: B ← argmaxB′∈childrenT (B)|subtreeT (B′)|
7: return B||GHOST(subtreeT (B))
8: end if
9: end function
The protocol is also parameterized by three external functions V(·), I(·), R(·)
which are called: the input validation predicate, the input contribution function,
and the chain reading function, respectively. V(·) dictates the structure of the
information stored in each block, I(·) determines the data that players put in the
block they mine, R(·) speciﬁes how the data in the blocks should be interpreted
depending on the application.
Algorithm 2 The GHOST backbone protocol, parameterized by the input con-
tribution function I(·) and the reading function R(·). xC is the vector of inputs
of all block in chain C.
1: T ← GenesisBlock . T is a tree.
2: state← ε
3: round← 0
4: while True do
5: Tnew ← update(T , blocks found in Receive())
6: C˜ ← GHOST(Tnew)
7: 〈state, x〉 ← I(state, C˜, round, Input(),Receive())
8: Cnew ← pow(x, C˜)
9: if C˜ 6= Cnew or T 6= Tnew then
10: T ← update(Tnew, head(Cnew))
11: Broadcast(head(Cnew))
12: end if
13: round← round+ 1
14: if Input() contains Read then
15: write R(xC) to Output()
16: end if
17: end while
Next, for completeness we present the remaining procedures of the GHOST
backbone protocol. Function pow (see Algorithm 3), which has to do with block
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mining and is the same as the one deﬁned in the Bitcoin Backbone and function
update (see Algorithm 4) which refers to the way the block tree is updated.
Algorithm 3 The proof of work function, parameterized by q, D and hash
functions H(·), G(·). The input is (x, C).
1: function pow(x, C)
2: if C = ε then . Determine proof of work instance
3: s← 0
4: else
5: 〈s′, x′, ctr′〉 ← head(C)
6: s← H(ctr′, G(s′, x′))
7: end if
8: ctr ← 1
9: B ← ε
10: h← G(s, x)
11: while (ctr ≤ q) do
12: if (H(ctr, h) < D) then
13: B ← 〈s, x, ctr〉
14: break
15: end if
16: ctr ← ctr + 1
17: end while
18: C ← CB . Extend chain
19: return C
20: end function
2.3 Security Properties
In [9, Deﬁnitions 2&3] two crucial security properties of the Bitcoin backbone
protocol were considered, the common preﬁx and the chain quality property. The
common preﬁx property ensures that two honest players have the same view of
the blockchain if they prune a small number of blocks from the tail. On the
other hand the chain quality property ensures that honest players' chains do
not contain long sequences of adversarial blocks. These properties are deﬁned as
predicates over the random variable formed by the concatenation of all parties'
views denoted by view
H(·)
Π,A,Z(κ, q, z).
Deﬁnition 4 (Common Preﬁx Property). The common preﬁx property Qcp
with parameter k ∈ N states that for any pair of honest players P1, P2 maintain-
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Algorithm 4 The tree update function, parameterized by q, D and hash func-
tions H(·), G(·). The inputs are a block tree T and an array of blocks.
1: function update(T ,B)
2: foreach 〈s, x, ctr〉 in T
3: foreach 〈s′, x′, ctr′〉 in B
4: if ((s′ = H(ctr,G(s, x))) ∧ (H(ctr′, G(x′, ctr′)) < D)) then
5: childrenT (〈s, x, ctr〉) = childrenT (〈s, x, ctr〉) ∪ 〈s′, x′, ctr′〉 . Add to the
tree.
6: end if
7: return T
8: end function
ing the chains C1, C2 in viewH(·)Π,A,Z(κ, q, z), it holds that
Cdk1  C2 and Cdk2  C1.
Deﬁnition 5 (Chain Quality Property). The chain quality property Qcq
with parameters µ ∈ R and ` ∈ N states that for any honest party P with
chain C in viewH(·)Π,A,Z(κ, q, z), it holds that for any ` consecutive blocks of C the
ratio of adversarial blocks is at most µ.
These two properties were shown to hold for the Bitcoin backbone protocol.
Formally, in [9, Theorems 9&10] the following were proved:
Theorem 1. Assume f < 1 and γu ≥ (1 + δ)λβ, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1) and
λ ≥ 1 such that λ2 − fλ − 1 ≥ 0. Let S be the set of the chains of the honest
parties at a given round of the backbone protocol. Then the probability that S does
not satisfy the common-preﬁx property with parameter k is at most e−Ω(δ
3k).
Theorem 2. Assume f < 1 and γu ≥ (1 + δ)λβ for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose
C belongs to an honest party and consider any ` consecutive blocks of C. The
probability that the adversary has contributed more than (1− δ3 ) 1λ` of these blocks
is less than e−Ω(δ
2`).
Robust public transaction ledger. In [9] the robust public transaction ledger
primitive was presented. It tries to capture the notion of a book where trans-
actions are recorded, and it is used to implement Byzantine Agreement in the
honest majority setting.
A public transaction ledger is deﬁned with respect to a set of valid ledgers L
and a set of valid transactions T , each one possessing an eﬃcient membership
test. A ledger x ∈ L is a vector of sequences of transactions tx ∈ T . Each trans-
action tx may be associated with one or more accounts. Ledgers correspond to
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chains in the backbone protocols. In the protocol execution there also exists an
oracle Txgen that generates valid transactions. Note, that it may be possible for
the adversary to create two transactions that are conﬂicting; valid ledgers must
not contain conﬂicting transaction. We will assume that the oracle is unambigu-
ous, i.e. the adversary cannot create transactions that come in `conﬂict' with
the transactions generated by the oracle. Finally, a transaction is called neutral
if there does not exist any transactions that comes in conﬂict with it. For more
details we refer to [9].
We slightly alter the deﬁnitions of persistence and liveness so that they are
relative to the way parties verify transactions. For example, in Bitcoin a transac-
tion is `stable' with parameter k if it is at least k blocks deep in the chain. On the
other hand, in GHOST the subtree rooted at the block containing a transaction
must be of size at least k in order for this transaction to be considered `stable'.
Whenever we talk about the persistence or liveness of Bitcoin or GHOST from
now on, we will imply the parameterized versions with the respective deﬁnitions
of stability that we just mentioned.
Deﬁnition 6. A protocol Π implements a robust public transaction ledger in
the q-bounded synchronous setting if it satisﬁes the following two properties:
Persistence: Parameterized by k ∈ N (the depth parameter), if in a certain
round an honest player reports a transaction tx as `stable' with parameter
k, then whenever an honest party reports it as stable, tx will be in the same
position in the ledger.
Liveness: Parameterized by u, k ∈ N (the wait time and depth parameters,
resp.), provided that a transaction either (i) issued by Txgen, or (ii) neutral,
is given as input to all honest players continuously for u consecutive rounds,
then all honest parties will report it as `stable' with parameter k from this
round on.
These two properties were shown to hold for the ledger protocol ΠPL build
on top of the Bitcoin Backbone protocol and appropriate instantiation of the
functions V, R and I. Formally, in [9, Lemma 15&16] the following were proved:
Lemma 1 (Persistence). Suppose f < 1 and γu ≥ (1 + δ)λβ, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1) and λ ≥ 1 such that λ2−fλ−1 ≥ 0. Protocol ΠPL satisﬁes Persistence
with probability 1− e−Ω(δ3k), where k is the depth parameter.
Lemma 2 (Liveness). Assume f < 1 and γu ≥ (1 + δ)λβ, for some δ ∈
(0, 1), λ ∈ [1,∞) and let k ∈ N. Further, assume oracle Txgen is unambiguous.
Then protocol ΠPL satisﬁes Liveness with wait time u = 2k/(1− δ)γu and depth
parameter k with probability at least 1− e−Ω(δ2k).
3 A uniﬁed description of Bitcoin and GHOST backbone
Next, we introduce our new analysis framework for backbone protocols that is
focusing on trees of blocks and we show how the description of the Bitcoin and
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GHOST can be uniﬁed. In this model, every player stores all blocks he receives on
a tree, starting from a pre-shared block called the Genesis (or vroot) block. This
is the model where GHOST was initially described. Bitcoin, and other possible
backbone variants, can also be seen in this model and thus a uniﬁed language
can be built. We ﬁrst deﬁne block trees (or just trees) that capture the knowledge
of honest players (regarding the block tree on diﬀerent moments at every round).
Deﬁnition 7. We denote by T Pr (resp. Tr) the tree that is formed from the
blocks that player P (resp. at least one honest player) has received up to round
r. Similarly, Tˆr is the tree that contains all blocks of Tr and all blocks mined by
honest players at round r. For any tree T and block b ∈ T , we denote by T (b)
the subtree of T rooted on b.
Notice that, due to the fact that broadcasts of honest players always succeed,
blocks in Tˆr are always in T Pr+1. Thus for every honest player P it holds that:
T Pr ⊆ Tr ⊆ Tˆr ⊆ T Pr+1
Intuitively, heavier trees represent more proof of work. However, there is more
than one way to deﬁne the weight of a tree. For example, in Bitcoin the heaviest
tree is the longest one. On the other hand, for GHOST a heavy tree is one with
many nodes. To capture this abstraction we condition our deﬁnitions on a norm
w that assigns weights on trees. This norm will be responsible for deciding which
tree has more proof of work, and thus which tree is favored by the chain selection
rule. We choose to omit w from the notation since it will always be clear from
the context which norm we use.
Deﬁnition 8. Let w be a norm deﬁned on trees. For any tree T let siblings(v)
denote the set of nodes in T that share the same parent with v. Then node v is
d-dominant in T (denoted by DomT (v, d)) iﬀ
w(T (v)) ≥ d ∧ ∀v′ ∈ siblings(v) : w(T (v)) ≥ w(T (v′)) + d
The chain selection rule in the Bitcoin protocol can be described using the
notion of the d-dominant node. Let w(T ) be the height of some tree T . Each
player P , starting from the root of his T Pr tree, greedily decides on which block
to add on the chain by choosing one of its 0-dominant children and continuing
recursively2 (ties are broken based on time-stamp, or based on which block was
received ﬁrst). Interestingly, the GHOST selection rule can also be described in
exactly the same way by setting w to be the number of nodes of the tree. Thus
we have a uniﬁed way for describing the chain selection rule in both protocols.
Building upon this formalism we can describe the paths that fully informed
honest players may choose to mine at round r (denoted by HonestPaths(r)) in
a quite robust way, thus showcasing the power of our notation.
2 This is exactly algorithm 1 with a minor modiﬁcation. At line 6 the subtree T that
is chosen maximizes w(T ).
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HonestPaths(r) = {p = vrootv1 . . . vk|p is a root-leaf path in Tr and
∀i ∈ {1, .., k} DomTr (vi, 0)}
We conclude this section by presenting two crucial properties that both the
Bitcoin and GHOST backbones satisfy. The ﬁrst property states that by broad-
casting k blocks the adversary can decrease the dominance of some block at most
by k. Intuitively, if the adversary's ability to mine new blocks is limited, then
his inﬂuence over the block tree is also limited. On the other hand, the second
property states that uniquely successful rounds increase the dominance of the
nodes in the path from the root to the new block.
We will use the term node and block interchangeably from now on.
Proposition 1. For the Bitcoin and GHOST backbone protocols it holds that:
 if the adversary broadcast k ≤ d blocks at round r − 1 then for every block
v ∈ Tˆr−1 it holds that DomTˆr−1(v, d) implies DomTr (v, d− k).
 if r is a uniquely successful round and the newly mined block b extends a path
in HonestPaths(r), then DomTˆr (b, 1) and for any block v in the path from
vroot to b it holds that DomTr (v, d) implies DomTˆr (v, d+ 1).
Proof. The lemma stems from the fact that adding only one block in the tree
reduces or increases the dominance of some block by at most 1. For the ﬁrst
bullet, adding k blocks one by one, implies that the dominance of any node will
reduce or increase by at most k. For the second bullet, notice that dominance
increases only for blocks that get heavier. The only blocks that get heavier in
this case are the ones in the path from the root to the newly mined block.
Since these blocks are in HonestPaths(r), they are at least 0-dominant and so
their dominance will further increase. Furthermore, the newly mined block is
1-dominant since it does not have any siblings.
4 Security Analysis and Applications
Next, we prove that the GHOST backbone protocol is suﬃcient to construct a
robust transaction ledger. From now on we assume that w(T ) is the total number
of nodes of tree T .
4.1 The Fresh Block Lemma
In [9], it was shown that the Bitcoin Backbone satisﬁes two main properties: com-
mon preﬁx and chain quality. However, another fundamental property needed
for their proof, is that the chains of honest players grow at least at the rate of
successful rounds. This does not hold for GHOST. The reason is that, if an honest
player receives a chain that is heavier than the one he currently has, he will
select it, even if it is shorter. To reﬂect these facts, we develop an argument that
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Fig. 1. An example of the change in dominance after a uniquely successful round. The
only nodes which increase their dominanceare the ones in the path from the root to
the newly mined block as stated in Proposition 1.
is a lot more involved and leads to a power lemma that we call the fresh block
lemma.
First, we introduce a new notion, that of a path that all of its nodes are
dominant up to a certain value. Intuitively, the more dominant a path is, the
harder it gets for the adversary to stop honest players from choosing it.
Deﬁnition 9. For d > 0, pdom(r, d) is the longest path p = vrootv1 . . . vk in Tˆr
s.t.
p 6= vroot ∧ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : DomTˆr (vi, d)
If no such path exists pdom(r, d) = ⊥.
Note that the dominant path pdom(r, d), if it is not ⊥, will be unique (this
stems from the requirement that d > 0).
In the next lemma, we show that unless the number of blocks the adversary
broadcasts in a round interval is at least as big as the number of uniquely suc-
cessful rounds that have occurred, an honest block mined in one of these rounds
will be deep enough in the chains of honest players. More speciﬁcally, for any se-
quence of m (not necessarily consecutive) uniquely successful rounds starting at
some round r′, no matter the strategy of the adversary, at round r there will be
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at least one honest block in pdom(r,m− k) where k is the number of adversarial
blocks that have been released during rounds [r′ − 1, r − 1].
Lemma 3. Let r1, .., rm be uniquely successful rounds from round r
′ until round
r. If the adversary broadcasts k < m blocks from round r′ − 1 until round r− 1,
then there exists an honest block b, mined in one of the rounds r1, .., rm such
that b is in pdom(r,m− k).
Proof sketch. The proof is based on two observations. Firstly, if the adversary
does not broadcast a block in the round before a uniquely successful round s, then
the newly mined honest block will be in pdom(s, 1). Secondly, if the adversary
broadcasts k < d blocks in the round before a uniquely successful round s, all
blocks in pdom(s − 1, d) at round s − 1 will also be in pdom(s, d + 1 − k). It
follows that for each uniquely successful round, unless the adversary broadcasts
a block, an honest block will be introduced in the dominant path and will be
maintained there unless the adversary broadcasts more blocks than the number
of uniquely successful rounds that follow. As a result, in the period from round r′
until round r, our assumption that the adversary broadcasts strictly less than m
blocks, implies that at least one block will be maintained in pdom(r,m− k).
The fresh block lemma is stated next. Informally, it states that at any point
in time, in any past sequence of s consecutive rounds, at least one honest block
was mined and is permanently inserted in the chain that every honest player
adopts, with overwhelming probability on s.
Lemma 4. (Fresh Block Lemma) Assume γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1) and f < 1. Then, for all s ∈ N and r ≥ s it holds that there exists a
block mined by an honest player on and after3 round r − s, that is contained in
the chain which any honest player adopts on and after round r with probability
1− e−Ω(δ2s).
Proof sketch. The diﬃculty of proving this lemma stems from the fact that in
GHOST, the chains of honest players are not always strictly increasing. That is,
honest players may switch from a longer to a shorter chain. Monotonicity allows
us to prove many useful things; for example that the adversary cannot use very
old blocks in order to maintain a fork as in [9].
To overcome this diﬃculty, we ﬁrst show that whenever the adversary forces
honest players to work on a diﬀerent branch of the block tree, he has to broadcast
as many blocks as the ones that where mined on uniquely successful rounds
on this branch of the tree. Hence, it is hard for the adversary to force honest
players to change branches all the time, and moreover, after s rounds this will
be impossible due to the fact that γ ≥ (1 + δ)β. But if all honest players stay on
one branch, the blocks near the root of the branch will permanently enter their
chains. We show that at least one of these blocks will be mined by an honest
player. By applying this idea in an iterative manner, the lemma follows.
For the full proof of the lemma we refer to the Appendix.
3 Throughout this work, we only consider executions that run for a polynomial number
of rounds in the security parameter κ.
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4.2 A robust public transaction ledger
In [9] it is shown how to instantiate the functions V, R, I so that the resulting
protocol, denoted by ΠPL, built on top of the Bitcoin backbone, implements a
robust transaction ledger. In this section we show how we can achieve the same
goal, using exactly the same instantiation of V,R,I, but on top of the GHOST
backbone. We call the resulting protocol, ΠGHOSTPL .
Having established that every s rounds a fresh and honest block is inserted
permanently in the chain of all players, we are in a position to prove the main
properties of a robust transaction ledger. Liveness stems from the fact that after
s rounds from the time a transaction was issued, an honest block that contains
this transaction will stabilize in the chain. Thus, by waiting for at most s/α
more rounds, the honest parties will mine enough block so that this transaction
becomes `stable' with parameter s. Persistence is implied by the fact that when
a player reports a transaction as stable for the ﬁrst time, enough time has passed
from the time the block containing the transaction was mined, and thus there
exists an honest block descending it that has been permanently added to the
chain of all honest parties.
Lemma 5 (Liveness). Assume γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and f < 1.
Further, assume oracle Txgen is unambiguous. Then for all k ∈ N protocol ΠGHOSTPL
satisﬁes Liveness with wait time u = k + k(1−δ)α rounds and depth parameter k
with probability at least 1− e−Ω(δ2k).
Proof. We prove that assuming all honest players receive as input the transaction
tx for at least u rounds, any honest party at round r with chain C will report
tx as `stable'. By Lemma 4 it follows that with probability 1 − e−Ω(δ2k) there
exists an honest block mined during rounds [r−u, r−u+k], such that all honest
players have this block in the chains they mine from round r−u+k and onward.
Without loss of generality this block contains tx. All blocks that honest players
mine during the remaining k(1−δ)α rounds will be descendants of this block. By
an application of the Chernoﬀ bound, with probability 1− e−Ω(δ2k), the honest
parties will mine at least k blocks in this round interval and thus the lemma
follows with the desired probability.
Lemma 6 (Persistence). Suppose γ ≥ (1+δ)β and (1+δ)f ≤ 1, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1). Then for all k ∈ N protocol ΠGHOSTPL satisﬁes Persistence with probability
1− e−Ω(δ2k), where k is the depth parameter.
Proof. Let B be the block that contains transaction tx that the honest party P
reported as stable at round r. We will argue that B must have been computed
before round r− k, and thus by Lemma 4 all honest players will report it in the
same position in their chains.
Let E1 be the event where B is computed after round r−k/((1+δ)f) < r−k.
The number of descendants of B cannot be greater than the number of solutions
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Y obtained from the oracle in this amount of rounds. By the Chernoﬀ bound,
Pr[Y ≥ (1 + δ)f k
(1 + δ)f
] = Pr[Y ≥ k] ≤ e−δ2fs/3.
Since tx is reported as stable, B must have k descendants and thus E1 implies
that Y must be greater or equal to k. Hence, Pr[E1] ≤ Pr[Y ≥ k] ≤ e−δ2fs/3.
Let E2 be the event where Lemma 4 does not hold for round r. This hap-
pens with probability at most e−Ω(δ
2k). By the union bound, the event E1 ∨E2
happens with probability at most e−Ω(δ
2k). Assuming that E1 ∨ E2 does not
occur, it follows that there exists an honest block B′ mined on and after round
r − k that will be in the chains of all honest players from round r and onward.
Hence, B must be an ancestor of B′ and all honest players will report B and
tx at the same position as P from round r and onward. Persistence follows with
the desired probability.
Theorem 3. Assuming γ ≥ (1 + δ)β and (1 + δ)f ≤ 1, for some real δ ∈ (0, 1),
the protocol ΠGHOSTPL implements a robust transaction ledger.
As a ﬁnal note, Lemma 4 is suﬃcient to prove Persistence and Liveness in
a black-box way. Compared to the approach of [9], that was further expanded
in [13] and [22], only one property, instead of three, of the underlying backbone
protocol suﬃces in order to get a robust public transaction ledger in a black-
box manner. On the other hand, the three properties described in these works,
common-preﬁx, chain quality and chain growth, also serve as metrics of the
eﬃciency of the underlying mechanism and provide more information than the
fresh block lemma.
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A Probability of uniquely successful rounds
In this section we demonstrate a lower bound on the probability of uniquely
successful rounds. This bound allows us to argue about the security of GHOST
even when f is larger than 1.
Lemma 7. For p < 0.1 and a ∈ (p, 2k) : e−a−kp ≤ (1− p) ap−k ≤ e−a+kp
Proof. The second inequality is well studied and holds for p > 0. For the ﬁrst
inequality by solving for a we get a ≤ k ln(1−p)
1+
ln(1−p)
p
which holds for p < 0.1 and
a ∈ (p, 2k).
Let γ be a lower bound on the probability of a uniquely successful round
(a round where only one block is found). From the event where (n − t) players
throw q coins each and exactly one coin toss comes head, the probability of a
uniquely successful rounds is at least:
(n− t)qp(1− p)q(n−t)−1 ≥ αe−α−kp
We set γ = ae−a−kp, for the minimum k that satisﬁes the relation α ∈ (p, 2k).
This is a substantially better bound that γu and is also a lower bound for the
event that at a round is successful. The relation of the two bounds is depicted
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Comparison of the lower bounds on the probability of a uniquely successful
round, γ and γu, used respectively in this work and [9]. Notice that γ allows as to
argue about security when f is greater than 1.
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We are ﬁrst going to prove two preliminary claims that show the eﬀect
of a uniquely successful round to pdom. The ﬁrst claim shows that if a uniquely
successful round s is not compensated accordingly by the adversary, a newly
mined block will be forced into pdom(s, 1).
Claim 1. Let round s be a uniquely successful round and b be the honest block
mined at round s. If the adversary does not broadcast any block at round s− 1
then b ∈ pdom(s, 1).
Proof of Claim. First, notice that since the adversary does not broadcast any
block it holds that for any honest player P , Ts is equal to T Ps . Therefore, all nodes
in the path from vroot to the parent of b are at least 0-dominant in Ts and thus
this path is in HonestPaths(s). Since s is uniquely successful, all conditions of the
second bullet of Proposition 1 are met, and thus it is implied that all nodes up to
the newly mined block in Tˆs are 1-dominant. It follows that b ∈ pdom(s, 1). a
The second claim shows the eﬀect of a uniquely successful round s to an
existing pdom(s− 1, d) path. Notice that if the adversary broadcasts less than d
blocks the same nodes continue to be at least 1-dominant in the following round.
Claim 2. Let round s be a uniquely successful round, b be the honest block mined
at round s and pdom(s− 1, d) 6= ⊥. If the adversary broadcasts (i) k < d blocks
at round s − 1 then pdom(s − 1, d) ⊆ pdom(s, d + 1 − k), (ii) k = d blocks at
round s − 1 then either b ∈ pdom(s, 1) or pdom(s − 1, d) ⊆ pdom(s, 1) and b is a
descendant of the last node in pdom(s− 1, d).
Proof of Claim. There are two cases. In the ﬁrst case suppose the adversary
broadcasts k < d blocks. Then, according to the ﬁrst bullet of Proposition 1, the
adversary can lower the dominance in Ts of nodes in pdom(s − 1, d) by at most
k. Thus pdom(s − 1, d) will be a preﬁx of all the chains in HonestPaths(s). But
because s is a uniquely successful round, the dominance in Tˆs of all nodes in
pdom(s− 1, d) will increase by one. Therefore pdom(s− 1, d) ⊆ pdom(s, d+ 1− k)
and b will be a descendant of the last node in pdom(s− 1, d).
In the second case suppose the adversary broadcasts k = d blocks. If he
does not broadcast all of these blocks to reduce the dominance in Ts of the
nodes in pdom(s − 1, d), then pdom(s − 1, d) will be a preﬁx of all the chains in
HonestPaths(s) and as in the previous case, pdom(s− 1, d) ⊆ pdom(s, d+ 1− k)
and b will be a descendant of the last node in pdom(s− 1, d).
Otherwise the adversary will reduce the dominance in Ts of at least one node
in pdom(s− 1, d) to zero. If b is a descendant of the last node in pdom(s− 1, d),
then all nodes in pdom(s − 1, d) will be 1-dominant in Tˆs and pdom(s − 1, d) ⊆
pdom(s, 1) = pdom(s, d + 1 − d). If b is not a descendant of the last node in
pdom(s−1, d), then for the player P that mined this block it holds that T Ps = Ts,
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because he would have not mined a chain that does not contain pdom(s − 1, d)
at round s otherwise. Therefore, P at round s was mining a chain that belonged
to HonestPaths(s, vroot) and thus all nodes in the chain are at least 0-dominant
in Ts. But because s is a uniquely successful round the dominance of all nodes
in the chain that b belongs to will increase by one and thus b ∈ pdom(s, 1). a
Let bi denote the honest block mined at round ri. Let us assume that r = rm.
We are going to prove the lemma using induction on the number of uniquely
successful rounds m.
For the base case suppose m = 1. The adversary does not broadcast any
block until round r1− 1 and from the ﬁrst claim b1 ∈ pdom(r1, 1). Thus the base
case is proved. Suppose the lemma holds for m − 1 uniquely successful rounds
and let k1 be the number of blocks that the adversary broadcasts in the round
interval [r′ − 1, rm−1 − 1]. We have two cases.
(First case) k1 = m − 1 and the adversary broadcasts no blocks in the rest
of the rounds. From the ﬁrst claim it follows that bm ∈ pdom(rm, 1).
(Second case) k1 < m − 1 and from the induction hypothesis there exist
blocks b′1, ..., b
′
m−1−k1 mined by honest players at the uniquely successful rounds
r1, .., rm−1 where b′i ∈ pdom(rm−1, i). Let k2 be the number of blocks that the
adversary broadcasts until round rm − 2 and k3 the number of blocks he broad-
casts at round rm−1. If k2 = m−1 then again from the ﬁrst claim it follows that
bm ∈ pdom(rm, 1). If k2 < m − 1 then if k3 + k2 = m − 1 then from the second
claim either bm ∈ pdom(rm, 1) or b′m−1−k1 ∈ pdom(rm, 1). If k3 + k2 < m − 1
then again from the second claim at round rm, b
′
i ∈ pdom(rm − 1, i) for i in
{k2 + k3 + 1, ..,m − 1 − k1} and either b′k2+k3 is in pdom(rm, 1) or bm is in
pdom(rm, 1). This completes the induction proof.
We proved that if k4 < m is the number of blocks the adversary broadcasts
until round rm − 1, then there exists honest blocks b′1, .., b′m−k4 s.t. b′i is in
pdom(rm, i). Now in the case r > rm, let k5 < m−k4 be the number of blocks the
adversary broadcasts in the remaining rounds. The lemma follows easily from
the second claim.
Remark 1. Let r1, .., rm be uniquely successful rounds up to round r and the
honest block mined at round r1 be in pdom(r1, 1). If the adversary broadcasts
k < m blocks from round r1 until round r− 1, then there exists an honest block
b mined in one of the rounds r1, .., rm such that b in pdom(r,m− k). (to see why
the remark holds notice that that blocks that the adversary broadcasts before
round r1 aﬀect only the dominant path at round r1, and not at the following
rounds)
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let random variable Zs1,s2 (resp. Z
bd
s1,s2) denote the number of blocks the
adversary computes (resp. broadcasts) from round s1 until round s2, and random
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variable Xs1,s2 denote the number of rounds that are uniquely successful in the
same interval.
We are ﬁrst going to prove two preliminary claims. We show that as long
as from some round r and afterwards the adversary broadcasts less blocks than
the total number of uniquely successful rounds, the chain that any honest player
adopts after round r extends pdom(r,X1,r − Z1,r). More generally we can prove
the following claim.
Claim 3. Consider any execution such that for all rounds s2 ≥ s1, for some round
s1, it holds that Z1,s2 < X1,s2 . Then, the chain that any honest player adopts
after round s1 extends pdom(s1, X1,s1 − Z1,s1).
Proof of Claim. Since X1,s1 > Z1,s1 from Lemma 3 it follows that
p = pdom(s1, X1,s1 − Z1,s1−1) 6= ⊥
As long as the number of blocks that the adversary broadcasts at round s2 are
less than the dominance of the nodes in p in Tˆs2−1, all honest players at round s2
will adopt chains containing p. Thus uniquely successful rounds will increase the
dominance of these nodes. But since from the assumptions made, Z1,s2 < X1,s2 ,
in all rounds after round s1, the nodes in p are at least 1-dominant in every T Ps2
where P is an honest player; the claim follows. a
Next we will show that if successive u.s. rounds occur such that the blocks
mined are on diﬀerent branches, then the adversary must broadcast an adequate
number of blocks, as speciﬁed below.
Claim 4. Consider any execution where s1 < s2 < ... < sm are u.s. rounds and
sk is the ﬁrst u.s. round such that the honest block mined in this round is not
a descendant of the honest block mined in round sk−1, for k ∈ {2, ..,m}. Then
either Zbds1−1,sm−1 > Xs1,sm−1 or Z
bd
s1−1,sm−1 = Xs1,sm−1 and the honest block
mined at round sm will be in pdom(sm, 1).
Proof of Claim. Let b1, .., bm denote the honest blocks mined at rounds s1, .., sm
respectively. We are going to prove the claim for m = 2. Suppose, for the sake
of contradiction, that Zbds1−1,s2−1 < Xs1,s2−1. By the deﬁnition of s2, the honest
blocks mined on all u.s. rounds until round s2 − 1 are descendants of b1. From
Lemma 3 at least one honest block b computed in one of the u.s. rounds in
[s1, s2−1] will be in pdom(s2−1, Xs1,s2−1−Zbds1−1,s2−2). Since from our hypothesis
the adversary will broadcast less than Zbds2−1,s2−1 < Xs1,s2−1−Zbds1−1,s2−2 blocks
at round s2 − 1, it is impossible for b2 not to be a descendant of b and thus
of b1 which is a contradiction. Hence, Z
bd
s1−1,s2−1 ≥ Xs1,s2−1. If Zbds1−1,s2−1 >
Xs1,s2−1 the base case follows. Otherwise, Z
bd
s1−1,s2−1 = Xs1,s2−1 and we have
two cases. In the ﬁrst case, Xs1,s2−1 = Z
bd
s1−1,s2−2 and at round round s2 − 1
the adversary does not broadcast any block. From Claim 1 of Lemma 3, b2 will
be in pdom(s2, 1). In the second case, it holds that the adversary broadcasts
exactly Xs1,s2−1−Zbds1−1,s2−2 blocks at round s2−1. From Claim 2 of Lemma 3,
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since b2 cannot be a descendant of the last node of pdom(s2 − 1, 1), b2 will be in
pdom(s2, 1). Hence, the base case follows.
Suppose the lemma holds until round sm. By the inductive hypothesis we
have two cases. In the ﬁrst case Zbds1−1,sm−1 > Xs1,sm−1, which implies that
Zbds1−1,sm−1 is greater or equal to Xs1,sm . If no u.s. round happens during rounds
sm+1, . . . , sm+1−1 then from Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 3 the claim follows.
Otherwise, a u.s. round s′ happens during these rounds, where the honest block
mined is a descendant of bm. Then we can make the same argument as for the
base case starting from round s′ and get that either Zbds′−1,sm+1−1 > Xs′,sm+1−1
or Zbds′−1,sm+1−1 = Xs′,sm+1−1 and the honest block mined at round sm+1 will be
in pdom(sm+1, 1). Since Z
bd
s′−1,sm+1−1 < Z
bd
sm−1,sm+1−1 and Xs′,sm+1−1 is equal to
Xsm+1,sm+1−1, by the inequality of the inductive hypothesis the claim follows.
In the second case Zbds1−1,sm−1 = Xs1,sm−1 and the honest block bm mined at
round sm will be in pdom(sm, 1). From Remark 1 of the proof of claim Lemma 3,
for an application of this Lemma from rounds sm until sm+1 − 1 we can count
the adversarial blocks starting from round sm. Thus from the same argument
as for the base case starting from round sm we get that either Z
bd
sm,sm+1−1 >
Xsm,sm+1−1 or Z
bd
sm,sm+1−1 = Xsm,sm+1−1 and the honest block mined at round
sm will be in pdom(sm, 1). By the equality of the inductive hypothesis the claim
follows. a
Next, we observe that Lemma 3 as well as Claim 3 and 4 can be applied on
a subtree of the block tree, if all honest blocks mined after the round the root
of the subtree was mined are on this subtree.
Observation 1. Let b be an honest block computed at round s1 that is in the
chains adopted by all honest players after round s2. Also, suppose that all blocks
mined at u.s. rounds after round s1 are descendants of b. Then the following
hold:
1. Regarding applications of Lemma 3 and Claim 4 on the subtree of the block
tree rooted on b after round s1, we can ignore all blocks that the adversary
has mined up to round s1.
2. Regarding applications of Claim 3 after round s2, we can ignore all blocks
that the adversary has mined up to round s1.
To see why the observation holds consider the following. Since the adversary
receives block b for the ﬁrst time at round s1 + 1, all blocks that the adversary
mines before round s1 + 1 cannot be descendants of b. Regarding the ﬁrst point,
blocks that are not descendants of b do not aﬀect the validity of Lemma 3 and
Claim 4 on the subtree of the block tree rooted on b; this is because blocks that
are not descendants of b, do not aﬀect the dominance of the nodes of the subtree
rooted at b. Regarding the second point, consider the dominant path at round
s3 > s2 in the subtree that is rooted on b. Then, this path can be extended up to
the root node, since, by our assumption, b is in the chains adopted by all honest
players after round s2.
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We are now ready to prove the lemma. First, we are going to deﬁne a set of
bad events which we will show that hold with probability exponentially small
in s. Assuming these events don't occur we will then show that our lemma is
implied, and thus the lemma will follow with overwhelming probability.
Let BAD(s1, s2) be the event that Xs1,s2 ≤ Zs1,s2 . In [9, Lemma 5], by an
application of the Chernoﬀ bounds it was proved that assuming that γ ≥ (1+δ)β
for some δ ∈ (0, 1), then with probability at least (1−e− β243 δ2s′)(1−e− γ128 δ2s′) ≥
1− e−(min( β243 , γ128 )δ2s′−ln(2)) for any r′ > 0, s′ ≥ s:
Xr′,r′+s′−1 > (1 +
δ
2
)Zr′,r′+s′−1 (1)
Thus, there exists an appropriate constant  = δ2 min( β243 ,
γ
128 ), independent
of r, such that it holds that for any r′ > 0, s′ ≥ s, BAD(r′, r′ + s′ − 1) occurs
with probability at most e−δ
2s′+ln 2. From an application of the union bound,
we get that for the function g(s) = δ2s − ln 2 + ln(1 − e−δ2), the probability
that
∨
r′≥sBAD(s1 + 1, s1 + r
′) happens is:
Pr[
∨
r′≥s
BAD(s1 + 1, s1 + r
′)] ≤
∑
r′≥s
e−δ
2r′+ln 2
≤eln 2
∑
r′≥s
e−δ
2r′
≤eln 2 e
−δ2s
1− e−δ2
≤e−g(s)
Until now we have assumed that the execution we are studying is collision-
free; no two queries in the oracle return the same value for diﬀerent inputs. Let
COL denote the event where a collision occurs in our execution. The probability
of COL in a polynomial number of rounds, is exponentially small on κ.
Pr[COL] ≤ (fκc)2/2κ+1 = e−Ω(κ) ≤ e−Ω(s)
Let BAD(s1) denote the event where
∨
r′≥sBAD(s1 + 1, s1 + r
′) or COL hap-
pens. From the union bound the probability that BAD(s1) happens, for any s1
is negligible.
Pr[BAD(s1)] ≤ e−g(s) + e−Ω(s) ≤ e−Ω(s)
We are going to show next that, conditioning on the negation of this event the
statement of the lemma follows.
We will use the convention that block bi is mined at round ri. Let b1 be
the most recent honest block that is in the chains that all honest players have
adopted on and after round r, such that the blocks mined at all u.s. rounds after
round r1 are descendants of b1. This block is well deﬁned, since in the worst case
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it is the genesis block. If r1 is greater or equal to r − s, then the lemma follows
for block b1 with probability 1.
Suppose round r1 is before round r− s and that BAD(r1) does not happen.
The negation of BAD(r1) implies that Xr1+1,r−1+c > Zr1+1,r−1+c, for c ≥ 0.
By Lemma 3 and Claim 3 there exists at least one honest block b2, mined in a
u.s. round and contained in the chains of all honest players on and after round
r. W.l.o.g. let b2 be the most recently mined such block. By the deﬁnition of
b1, b2 is a descendant of b1. If r2 is greater or equal to r − s then the lemma
follows, since b2 is an honest block mined on and after round r− s that satisﬁes
the conditions of the lemma.
Suppose round r2 is before round r − s. Let r3 be the earliest u.s. round,
such that b3 and the blocks mined at all u.s. rounds afterwards are descendants
of b2. Since b2 will be in the chains of all honest players after round r, round
r3 is well deﬁned. Also let s1 < . . . < sm < . . . be the sequence of u.s. rounds
after round r1 that satisfy the conditions of Claim 4. That is, sk is the ﬁrst u.s.
round such that the honest block mined in this round is not a descendant of the
honest block mined in round sk−1, for k ∈ {2, ..,m}. The ﬁrst u.s. round after
round r1 corresponds to s1.
We will argue that r3 is equal to some si > s1 in the aforementioned sequence.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that it does not. This implies that the
honest block mined at round r3 (denoted by b3) is a descendant of the honest
block mined at some round si of the sequence. W.l.o.g. suppose that si is the
largest such round that is before round r3. There are three cases. In the ﬁrst
case, r2 < si < r3. By the deﬁnition of si and r3, the block mined at round si is
an ancestor of b3 and also a descendant of b2. Hence, si satisﬁes the deﬁnition
of r3 which is a contradiction (there is an earlier round than r3 with the same
property). In the second case, si = r4, where b4 is a descendant of b1 and either
b2 = b4 or b4 is an ancestor of b2. Then b4 is a block that satisﬁes the deﬁnition of
b1, and is more recent, which is a contradiction. In the third case, r1 < si < r2
and the block mined at round si is not an ancestor of b2. By the deﬁnition
of si, the honest block mined at round si is an ancestor of b3, that has been
mined before round r2. But this is contradictory, since no honest block can be
an ancestor of b3, mined before round r2, but not be an ancestor of b2.
Since we proved that r3 is equal to some si we can apply Claim 4 from
round r1 +1 until round r3. Again, from Observation 1, regarding applications of
Claim 4 after round r1 we can ignore blocks that were mined before round r1 +1.
Then either Zr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Zbdr1+1,r3−1 > Xr1+1,r3−1 or Zr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Zbdr1+1,r3−1 =
Xr1+1,r3−1 and the honest block mined at round r3 will be in pdom(r3, 1).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that round r3 is after round r2 + s.
Then (r3−1)−(r1 +1) ≥ s and Zr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Xr1+1,r3−1. This is a contradiction,
since in this case ¬BAD(r1) implies Zr1+1,r3−1 < Xr1+1,r3−1. Therefore, r3 ≤
r2 + s < r. In addition, notice that ¬BAD(r1) also implies
Xr1+1,r2+s > Zr1+1,r2+s (2)
We are going to apply Lemma 3 and Observation 1 from round r3 until round
r2 + s in the subtree rooted at b2. According to the analysis we made previously
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there are two cases. In the ﬁrst case, Zbdr1+1,r3−1 > Xr1+1,r3−1 or equivalently
Zbdr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Xr1+1,r3 . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that r3 = r2 + s.
Then Zr1+1,r2+s−1 ≥ Xr1+1,r2+s. But this is a contradiction, since ¬BAD(r1)
implies Inequality 2. Therefore, r3 < r2 + s. From Inequality 2:
Xr3+1,r2+s ≥ Xr1+1,r2+s −Xr1+1,r3 > Zr1+1,rk+s − Zbdr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Zbdr3,r2+s
The last inequality, stems from two facts: that we can ignore blocks that were
mined before round r1 + 1 regarding applications of Lemma 3 and also that the
blocks that the adversary broadcasts at distinct rounds are diﬀerent (adversaries
that broadcast the same block multiple times can be ignored without loss of
generality).
In the second case, Zbdr1+1,r3−1 = Xr1+1,r3−1 and the honest block mined at
round r3 will be in pdom(r3, 1). Again from Inequality 2:
Xr3,r2+s = Xr1+1,r2+s −Xr1+1,r3−1 > Zr1+1,rk+s − Zbdr1+1,r3−1 ≥ Zbdr3,r2+s
The same analysis holds for all rounds after r2 + s. By an application of
Claim 3, an honest block b, computed in one of the u.s. rounds after round r2
and before round r, will be in the chains that honest players adopt on and after
round r. Since b2 is the most recently mined block, before round r− s, included
in the chain of all honest players, b must have been mined on and after round
r − s (since r3 > r2). Let A be the event that there exists a block mined by an
honest player on and after round r− s, that is contained in the chain which any
honest player adopts after round r. We have proved that (¬BAD(r1)) implies
A. Then:
Pr[A] =Pr[A ∧BAD(r1)] + Pr[A ∧ ¬BAD(r1)]
≥Pr[A ∧ ¬BAD(r1)]
=Pr[A|¬BAD(r1)]Pr[¬BAD(r1)]
=Pr[¬BAD(r1)]
≥1− e−g(s)
Hence, the lemma holds with probability at least 1− e−g(s).
